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WHere is Germany HeaDinG?
WHere is Germany HeaDinG? 
and level of authority within the Union. Notre Europe therefore seeks to identify 
promote ways of further democratising European governance. 
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that strengthens, and solidarity that unites ». This, in essence, is the European 
contract as defined by Jacques Delors. True to this approach, Notre Europe explores 
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Introduction
More than ever, Germany is today the focus of much attention on the European 
scene. The difficult negotiation over the assistance package to Greece and the 
setting up of a stabilisation fund has earned Chancellor Merkel bad press. Germany 
has been castigated and blamed for a lack of vision for its reluctance to help its 
Eurozone partners who are also among its main clients.
However, much of this criticism could be turned on its head. As Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa, President of Notre Europe, has recalled in a recent paper, no European 
country has ever consented to as big a transfer of sovereignty as Germany did when 
it accepted to do away with the Deutsche Mark. That, in and of itself, is sufficient 
to explain why she has found it difficult to tolerate the unruly behaviour of other 
Eurozone members. Moreover, it required great courage on the part of Mrs. Merkel 
to eventually accept the rescue package against a majority of German public 
opinion and the advice of some of her most prominent advisers.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that Germany now finds itself in a leadership 
position that it has not sought, and that it seems at times reluctant to exert. This 
is why it seems appropriate to discuss some of the factors that shape its European 
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policy. To this end, Notre Europe has turned to a series of experts who examine 
the changes that have taken place at various levels. Can Germany really be consid-
ered more inward-looking than it used to be before? Is this a long-term trend? How 
can the evolution of German European policy be explained? What are the current 
driving actors and forces?
Contributions have been made by German (or Greek-German) experts and are 
completed by a British external point of view.
• Janis A. Emmanouilidis (EPC) and Almut Möller (DGAP) start by scrutinis-
ing Germany’s perception of EU’s integration and what they consider as a 
process of German European policy normalisation.
• Daniela Schwarzer  (SWP) examines  expectations from Germany’s specific 
relation to the Eurozone.
• Henrik Uterwedde (Franco-German Institut of Ludwigsburg) evaluates the 
specificity of Germany’s cooperative capitalism model and its constraints 
regarding EU’s futher integration.
• Stefan Seidendorf (Franco-German Institut of Ludwigsburg) looks over 
opinion polls to examine the evolution of German elites and the assertion 
of a more popular public opinion, regarding the EU.
• Timo Behr (Finnish Institute of International Affairs) explores the state of 
mind of German’s government when faced with the requirement of playing 
an active role in a more integrated European foreign policy.
• Finally, William E. Paterson (Aston Centre for Europe, Aston University) 
analyses the pressures on German European vocation and the risks of a 
more British European policy temptation. 
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I - General Perception of EU Integration: Accommodating a  
     ‘New Germany’
Janis a. Emmanouilidis (senior Policy analyst, ePc) anD almut möllEr (HeaD of tHe alfreD 
von oPPenHeim center for euroPean Policy stuDies, DGaP)
Germany’s Europapolitik (European politics) has changed in the two last decades. 
Following German reunification, the Berliner Republik (Berlin Republic) is in 
a constant process of adapting itself to a new environment following the treaty 
reforms of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, the consequences of the failed 
constitutional project, the major enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007, and the 
more recent economic, financial and sovereign debt crises. From a negative per-
spective one could argue that German EU politics seem inconsistent and lacking 
a clear strategic orientation. From a more positive standpoint one could describe 
this process as a logical policy adaptation and learning curve, which is part of a 
normalisation of Germany’s Europapolitik.
The struggle for direction
The general feeling of belonging to the European Union has not (yet) been put 
into question either by the political elite or the majority of German citizens. But 
at the same time, Germany’s European orientation has become more pragmatic 
and somehow ‘normal’ when compared to other larger EU countries. With 
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increasing budgetary constraints since reunification, the federal government 
and the German Länder have become more and more focused on the financial 
impacts of EU policies. This became already visible in the negotiations over the 
Financial Perspective 2007-2013 and even more so in recent debates following 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis. And one can expect that this trend will continue 
in the upcoming debate and negotiations about the next Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework. But it would being going too far to assume that Berlin bases its EU 
engagement solely on a pure cost/benefit analysis, even if the positive German 
attitude towards European integration has certainly profited from the fact that the 
benefits of economic and monetary integration are obvious and manifest them-
selves in a huge German intra-EU trade surplus.
Under Chancellor Schröder (1998-2005), Germany’s European orientation had 
already become more pragmatic, less visionary and more determined by national 
economic, political and financial interests. The Greek sovereign debt crisis, which 
eventually developed into a broader euro crisis, is further affecting Germany’s 
European conviction and role within the EU. While the argument of ‘solidarity’ 
was still effectively employed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the 1990s to convince 
Germans of the need for big-bang enlargement, it has become much more difficult 
for the Merkel government to make the case for solidarity in the current crisis. 
More and more Germans – pushed by influential parts of the media – feel that they 
have to ‘pay’ for Europe and for a crisis caused by others inside the Union. At the 
peak of the Greek crisis, some media ran the headline that Germany should never 
again be Europe’s paymaster and Chancellor Merkel benefited from a tough stance 
vis-à-vis Athens and other EU capitals. However, the tide turned as the crisis pro-
gressed. The Merkel government was eventually ‘forced’ to show leadership and 
support the Greek rescue package and the €750bn crisis facility set up in early May 
2010. Subsequently, the approval ratings for Angela Merkel and her government 
coalition plunged, as large parts of German society were highly critical of how they 
had managed the situation. But it is too early to judge how the euro crisis and the 
reactions to will affect Germany’s European conviction in the long term and much 
will depend on how the economic situation develops in the years to come.
In the course of the sovereign debt crisis much attention and responsibility has 
fallen on Germany. The continent’s largest economy has (again) become Europe’s 
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benchmark. The spread differential between German and other European bonds 
has become a key indicator of financial (in)stability, and decisions taken in 
Berlin – such as the €80bn austerity package or the constitutional debt limita-
tion (Schuldenbremse) – provoke and/or necessitate policy reactions in other EU 
countries.
In this situation, many in Europe – governments, market players and commen-
tators – expect Germany to show leadership. But taking up a stronger leader-
ship role is no easy task for Berlin to fulfil and for other capitals to deal with, for 
a number of reasons. First, the federal government needs to cope with growing 
domestic pressures expecting the executive to ‘defend’ national interests. This 
makes it all the more difficult for Berlin to portray itself as a motor of integration 
and as a defender of ‘genuine European interests’, which also takes into account 
the interests of other smaller EU members. Secondly, it has become increasing-
ly difficult for individual EU countries – even the biggest one(s) – to exercise 
leadership in an enlarged and more heterogeneous Union of 27 and eventually 
more member states. The increased size of the Union and the growing diversity 
of interests in an EU27+ have also structurally weakened the importance and 
leverage of the Franco-German axis and one cannot identify any new, alternative 
leadership coalitions. Third, and most important, history has shown us that neither 
Germany nor the rest of the Europe are able to cope with German leadership. It is 
thus somehow a paradox that in many member states there is both moaning about 
a lack of German leadership and an increasing fear of German dominance.
At the peak of the euro crisis, Chancellor Merkel was not only struggling to organise 
support within her own party, in the coalition government between the CDU/CSU 
and the FDP, in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Berlin’s handling of the crisis 
also raised many questions in other EU capitals. Within a few months the Merkel 
government lost a great deal of sympathy and support across Europe. At times, the 
growing speculation and perception among governments, analysts and commen-
tators in the media about Germany going ‘anti-European’ seemed the result of a 
weak and inconsistent communication policy. There is some truth to that, as the 
German political establishment was in many ways unable to explain its position and 
convey its policy choices to the outside world. However, the underlying problem is 
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more substantial: it is the result of different readings and policy responses con-
cerning the crisis. Contradictory and often irreconcilable perceptions opposed 
each other. The Merkel government and a vast majority of German opinion-makers 
held that by insisting on the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (especially the 
no bail-out clause) they were the ones actually defending European interests and 
the stability of the common currency. This assessment contrasted with the position 
in other EU countries, especially in those most affected by the debt crisis, where 
there was rising concern that Germany’s reluctance to assist fellow euro countries 
was playing into the hands of speculators and thus worsening the situation.
The constitutional trauma
The failure of the constitutional project in 2005 marked a clear rupture for 
Germany’s Europapolitik. Having initiated a joint initiative with Italy during the 
Nice intergovernmental conference in December 2000 to discuss wider questions 
of European integration in a “post-Nice process”, Germany was one of the main 
proponents of the Laeken Declaration (December 2001) and the Constitutional 
Convention (2002-2003). In the early years of the new millennium, the succes-
sive coalition governments of Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel supported and 
framed the idea of a European Constitution. But the negative French and Dutch 
referenda in 2005 and the years of agony that followed have left their marks. Under 
the German EU Presidency in 2007, Berlin managed a way out of the constitutional 
stalemate opening up the path towards the Lisbon Treaty. However, the ‘constitu-
tional trauma’ has created a great deal of disillusion about the future of the ‘grand 
European project’.
Visions for the future of the European Union do not rank high in today’s debate in 
Germany. Indeed, the second Merkel government had already taken a passive, low 
profile approach on EU affairs since coming into office in the fall of 2009, for which 
it was widely criticised by analysts and commentators even before the sovereign 
debt crisis started to unfold. The political establishment rather focuses on day-to-
day European politics and on achieving greater efficiency and influence within the 
system created by the Lisbon Treaty.
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However, the once visionary notion of differentiated integration could reappear 
and start playing a greater role. While the issue was ranking high in the concep-
tual debates of the 1990s (e.g. Schäuble-Lamers paper), the instruments of flex-
ibility introduced and further developed since the Amsterdam Treaty had not been 
applied in practice but were rather (mis)used as tools to pressure the ‘unwilling’. 
The debates about directorates, triumvirates, pioneer and avant-garde groups 
or centres of gravity have been to a large extent characterised by threats and by 
semantic and conceptual misunderstandings, which have overshadowed the 
fact that differentiation provides a key strategic opportunity in a bigger and more 
heterogeneous EU. But the concept of differentiation could undergo a revival in 
the years to come, as the instruments of differentiation are constructivelyap-
plied in practice. Germany has in the first half of 2010 – together with 13 other 
EU countries – supported the first case of enhanced cooperation, concerning 
common divorce rules for couples of mixed nationality. The use of enhanced coop-
eration will provide a first opportunity to get familiar with this key instrument of 
differentiation in practice and this could in return lead to more cases of enhanced 
cooperation in the years to come. It seems likely that Germany will support a func-
tional-pragmatic approach which aims to overcome concrete blockades in specific 
areas, rather than a model of differentiation aiming at a substantial transfer of sov-
ereignty well beyond the current level in the EU.
Karlsruhe, the Länder and the battle between Federal Chancellery 
and Foreign Ministry
From the 1990s up to the Constitutional Convention, the German federal states 
(Länder) played an important role in framing the German EU debate. In the past, 
one could hardly leave any EU related meeting without having heard the catch-
words of ‘subsidiarity’ and ‘competencies’. Since the agreement on and the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Länder have become somehow appeased. This 
is partly due to the fact that many of their demands to strengthen the role of the 
federal states have been met both with amendments to the EU Treaties and the 
Grundgesetz in the follow-ups to the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaty.
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Nowadays it is not so much the Länder but rather the Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) in Karlsruhe that limits the government’s room for 
manoeuvre. One can criticise the Court’s 2009 ruling on the Lisbon Treaty for 
its flawed assumptions regarding the role of the European Parliament and for 
stepping beyond its actual competencies. However, the Court’s verdicts are widely 
accepted as authoritative rulings and the Bundersverfassungsgericht enjoys a 
high standing amongst both political elites and citizens. The Lisbon as well as 
other earlier EU-related verdicts have become points of reference in the debate 
and have affected government policies in recent months, as the executive fears 
that its decision to support the rescue packages might be ‘successfully’ chal-
lenged in front of the Court. This is one reason why the Merkel government has 
strongly argued that any assistance to individual EU countries was only possible 
as an ultima ratio. At the same time, the Constitutional Court seems to be reflect-
ing on its role and one should not rule out the scenario of Karlsruhe being pushed 
back by calls for judicial self-constraint.
A recent development of the Lisbon Treaty has created another domestic challenge: 
the year-old battle between the Federal Chancellery (Kanzleramt) and the Foreign 
Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt), usually taken by the small coalition partner, has 
entered a new phase. The Kanzleramt has increased its power at the expense of the 
Auswärtiges Amt, as the Heads of State and government play a stronger role than 
Foreign Ministers in the Union’s new institutional architecture. The Lisbon Treaty 
has enhanced the power position of the European Council as the Union’s strategic 
initiator and ultimate decision-taker. But according to the new Lisbon rules and 
contrary to the past, Foreign Ministers no longer participate in EU summits. As 
Foreign Ministers have been sidelined, the Auswärtiges Amt might compensate 
its loss of authority by acting as a spoiler rather than a facilitator of German EU 
politics.
The end of Konsenspolitik
For many decades, the European integration process was treated as a ‘sacred 
cow’ in the German political debate. The European Union was considered not as a 
matter of party politics. Germany’s Europapolitik was based on a solid consensus 
WHere is Germany HeaDinG? - 9
Studies &
79
Research
across party lines and critical voices were not welcomed but rather isolated in the 
political arena.
However, the EU debate started to change after Maastricht when the Union’s impact 
on member-state policies increased. While none of the six parties represented in 
the German Bundestag can be qualified as ‘anti-EU’, criticism is nowadays put 
forward by all parties, both towards issues related to the future direction of the 
European Union and to its day-to-day business. Issues discussed include enlarge-
ment (in particular Turkey’s accession), the development of the Union’s security 
and defence policy, the future of European economic governance, and the balance 
between economic and social policies. Furthermore, with the Schröder/Fischer 
government (1998-2005), a new generation of politicians, born and grown up in 
post-1945 Germany, has entered the stage. Only very few active politicians, such 
as Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, are left of the once influential circles of 
‘Europeans by heart’, who dominated the Bonner Republik after 1949. Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, who grew up in the German Democratic Republic, is not guided by 
a particular vision of Europe but rather by a very pragmatic and less emotional 
approach towards European integration.
Indeed it is the conservative CDU party of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982-
1998), one of the architects of the European Union, which under Merkel has expe-
rienced the most visible shifts in this regard. The CSU, the Bavarian sister party of 
the CDU, is usually at the forefront when it comes to questions of subsidiarity, but 
as explained above, the issue has lost its political relevance at the moment. The 
Green Party in many ways seems ready to accept the European Union as a natural 
arena, as its major priorities such as environmental policy are by nature considered 
to be dealt with most efficiently at a supranational level. The Free Democrats (FDP), 
Chancellor Merkel’s coalition partner and the party of Hans-Dietrich Genscher and 
Klaus Kinkel, are committed to support the process of European Union, but have 
not been very energetic since they entered the government and with it the Foreign 
Ministry in September 2009.
The political ‘left’ is somewhat struggling with EU affairs as the European Union is 
perceived by many voters on this side of the political spectrum as ‘too neo-liber-
al’ and as a catalyst of unfettered globalisation. The most ‘left wing’ party in the 
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Bundestag, the Left Party (Die Linke), which was founded in 2007 as the merger of 
the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) and the Electoral Alternative for Labour 
and Social Justice (WASG), has in its short history always been the most critical 
voice and has repeatedly voted against major EU treaty reforms.
The Social Democrats (SPD), the party of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, have 
a long pro-European tradition. However, the SPD has recently adopted decisions 
that raised eyebrows in Berlin and put into question the party’s traditional commit-
ment to the European integration process. The abstention of a majority of SPD MPs 
in the votes on the financial assistance for Greece and the security umbrella for the 
Eurozone has been a hitherto unprecedented case. On a major question that will 
determine the direction of the European Union in the months and years to come, 
the SPD leadership decided to deny their support to the government. It remains to 
be seen whether this move was largely motivated by political tactics or whether it 
constitutes a deeper shift in the party’s European orientation.
In more general terms, it remains to be seen whether some of the major parties 
including the SPD or the CDU/CSU will opt in favour of a more EU-critical approach 
in an attempt to profit in future elections from a spreading negative EU sentiment 
in many parts of German society.
Conclusions and outlook
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the ‘unification’ of the continent have changed 
Germany both domestically and with regard to its role in the European Union and 
in international relations. Twenty years down the road, Germany is still adapting 
to the transition from the Bonn to the Berlin Republic and the pre-Maastricht to 
the new Lisbon era. In its foreign policy, Berlin has started to break new ground, 
of which its active engagement in the Balkans and in Afghanistan are the most 
visible proof. However, the transformation of Germany’s foreign policy has turned 
out to be a difficult process so far, touching on the very identity of the country and 
its citizens.
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With successive rounds of enlargement and treaty reforms, the old days of European 
integration have vanished. The future direction of the Union has become a lot more 
difficult to map out and domestic constraints have made it more difficult for suc-
cessive German governments over the last decade to set and pursue their agenda.
Today, Germany’s Europapolitik does not always appear to be consistent, inclusive, 
convincing and confident. The European ‘constitutional trauma’, the restrictive 
verdicts of the Constitutional Court and the euro crisis have created a great deal of 
disillusion about the future of the ‘grand European project’. However, the overall 
commitment to the process of European integration has not been fundamentally 
challenged up till now and remains a solid pillar of Germany’s self-image.
However, it is not clear whether the disillusionment of recent years and months 
will in the long run increase scepticism towards the European Union or merely 
result in an even more pragmatic and inward-looking orientation of Germany’s 
Europapolitik. In any case, Berlin’s partners in the EU will have to accustom and 
accommodate themselves to this ‘new Germany’. To reminisce about the ‘good 
old days’ will not be enough. One can learn from the past that the deepening of 
European integration and the continued pooling of sovereignty have always been 
a successful way to answer the question of leadership in Europe.
12 - WHere is Germany HeaDinG?
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II - Germany and the Euro:  a Reluctant Leader?
daniEla schwarzEr (HeaD of researcH Division eu-inteGration, sWP)
 
 
Germany’s evaluation of ten years of EMU
When the euro celebrated its tenth anniversary on 1 January 2009, the single 
currency was widely evaluated as a success story in Germany. In particular as 
the financial and economic crisis hit Europe, German policy makers pointed out 
that the euro had brought an important degree of stability to the Eurozone, both 
in terms of inflation and exchange rate stability for the common market. Some 
commentators sketched dark scenarios about what might have happened in the 
EU had there not been a single currency: major exchange rate instabilities could 
have emerged, most probably leading to a strong appreciation of the Deutschmark 
had it still existed. Germany’s economy would have suffered considerably given 
the country’s export dependency. In 2009, 43% of Germany’s exports went to 
the Eurozone (63% to the EU) adding up to 14% of Germany’s GDP (21% of GDP 
for exports to the EU).1 A possible appreciation of the Deutschmark had already 
been among the strong economic cases for the creation of the euro in the 1990s. 
1 Statistisches Bundesamt: Außenhandel: Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Statistiken/Aus-
senhandel/Handelspartner/Tabellen/Content100/RangfolgeHandelspartner,property=file.pdf
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Some other member states which had pegged their currency to the Deutschmark 
for many years would have probably reconsidered their decision to shadow the 
Bundesbank’s monetary policy had there not been the perspective of EMU mem-
bership. A resulting further appreciation of the Deutschmark would have weighed 
heavily on Germany’s export sector.
While political leaders did not show regret for Germany’s post-war currency – 
on the contrary, they outlined its benefits in many speeches – the broad public 
evaluates the euro more critically. Since 2001, the percentage of citizens who see 
disadvantages in the euro has climbed from 45% of the people polled to 63% 
(April 2010). Only 30% today think that the euro has more advantages than dis-
advantages, only 6 % think both are balanced.2 The major matter of concern is 
whether inflation has increased since the start of EMU. Tabloids often nickname 
the euro “Teuro”3 reflecting the citizens’ sentiment that prices have risen strongly 
since its arrival. Inflation data for Germany contradicts this perception: from 1999 
to 2009, German inflation has on average been 1,5%4 and ranged below the ECB’s 
target of 2%. While price stability is a major issue, little attention is paid to the fact 
that the German economy been been for several years among the weak performers 
in the Eurozone, with only Italy doing worse.
Fears of inflation and strategies to convince of the euro
Before the introduction of the euro, Germany experienced an emotional debate on 
whether it should give up the Deutschmark, which had become the symbol of the 
post-war Wirtschaftswunder and helped the country re-emerge as a European and 
global player. The economic success, the stable currency and the related interna-
tional recognition were among the few things Germans dared to show pride in after 
World War II. 
The debate over giving up the Deutschmark grew particularly intense when it 
became clear that the currency union would probably start with a rather large 
2 ARD- DeutschlandTREND, April 2010, Infratest dimap. 
3 “Teuro” plays with the words “Euro” and “teuer” (expensive).
4 Own calculations based on Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=
1&language=de&pcode=tsieb060
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group of countries, including Italy, Spain and Portugal, the so-called “Club Med”5. 
Concerns about the future stability of the euro revealed deeply rooted fears of 
a society which had lived through a hyperinflation in the early 20th century, the 
effects of which were a root cause for the emergence of the racist and belligerent 
Nazi regime. 
In the 1990s, the critics of the upcoming EMU were divided into two groups. While 
some opponents did not want EMU to happen at all, other critics, including the 
then President of the Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, argued for a political union 
to ensure that in particular national budgetary policies would not undermine 
monetary stability. In order to reassure an increasingly nervous public, the acting 
government underlined the strong degree of independence of the European Central 
Bank enshrined in its statutes which could only be changed by a unanimous 
decision of the member states, hence not against the will of the German govern-
ment. By pushing through the Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, it hardened fiscal 
rules and the possibility to sanction member states in order to complement the 
Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, it explained that the no-bail-out-clause ensured 
that no government would be liable to guarantee public debt accumulated by other 
member states in the EMU. These provisions were not only relevant for the public 
debate, but also the basis upon which the German Constitutional Court ruled that 
the Maastricht Treaty was compatible with the German Basic Law.6
Repercussions of the sovereign debt crisis in the EMU
The sovereign debt crisis that the EMU is currently living through shattered these 
mantras like an earthquake. The European Central Bank is now buying Greek gov-
ernment bonds, which has made some German commentators say that the ECB 
has been transformed into Europe’s largest “bad bank” and that it has lost its 
independence. The Stability and Growth Pact in particular has lost credibility 
since Greece and some other EMU member states have become candidates for a 
possible sovereign default. Trust in the fiscal rules designed to guarantee sound 
5 In 1997, in Baden-Württemberg, the Social Democrat, Dietmar Spöri, (unsuccessfully) fought his electoral 
campaign to become regional Prime Minister with an anti-Euro-campaign (which he lost)
6 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Maastricht-Urteil vom 12. Oktober 1993, Aktenzeichen 2 BvR 2134/92.
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budgetary policies had been undermined ever since Germany itself broke the pact 
in the early years of EMU and pushed through a reform of the framework in 2005 
together with France. 
The rescue package for Greece and the €750bn rescue umbrella for the Eurozone, 
to which Germany contributes a total possible maximum of €148bn of guarantees 
and loans, was particularly difficult to digest for the German public. Despite the 
fact that the German Constitutional Court has so far not found that these decisions 
contradict its initial ruling on the Maastricht Treaty, quite a few commentators 
argue that the no-bail-out-clause had actually been given up. Complaints to the 
Constitutional Court have been filed. Many citizens feel that the Eurozone had 
turned into a currency union à la française in which the orthodox liberal framework 
of the Maastricht Treaty is undermined, and that a transfer union has de facto been 
installed in which those member states that have conducted sound budgetary 
policies end up paying for those who cheat and behave irresponsibly.
Foot dragging on Greece
Domestic and foreign observers paid a lot of attention to the fact that the German 
government did not act pro-actively on Greece in spring 2010. Indeed, for quite 
some time, it did not show a convincing commitment to the decision of the informal 
European Council of 11 February 2010 which promised the help to member gov-
ernments with problems refinancing their debt. For months, it did not recognise 
(publicly) that it had an important interest in preventing a spread of the financial 
crisis and a disorderly sovereign default in a member state with all its negative 
consequences for financial market stability and its potential political and social 
repercussions. The absence of an early and credible German commitment to 
helping Greece has probably increased nervousness in the financial markets and 
it has opened ample room for irresponsible polarisation in the German tabloid 
press. With an unparalleled degree of hostility, Greek citizens have been depicted 
as lazy, corrupt, irresponsible, etc. While there were efforts by other media to draw 
a more realistic picture of the situation in Greece, at least for a few weeks the 
situation in the German media remained unbalanced.
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There are probably three reasons why decision-makers in Berlin did not give earlier 
rescue promises to Athens. One concern was to exert as much public pressure on 
the Greek government as possible in order to support Prime Minister Papandreou’s 
reform agenda. The second concern was a hostile public opinion – and no will-
ingness to attempt to convince the public  of Germany’s self-interest in granting 
support, as North-Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s largest Land, went to the polls on 
9 May 2010. The strongest concern was probably that a German participation in a 
rescue package, which could not be justified with the argument that the stability 
of the euro was at stake, could be challenged before the German Constitutional 
Court. Policy-makers were deeply concerned by the scenario of a European rescue 
package being ruled unconstitutional in Germany, which was feared to cause sub-
stantial instabilities in financial markets.
Germany and European economic policy coordination
In parallel to the negotiation of rescue packages for Eurozone members, a profound 
debate on the reform of the budgetary and economic governance mechanisms has 
developed. External observers regularly wonder why Germany is so reluctant to 
deepen European economic coordination. It is wrong to assume that Germany is 
against coordination as such. However, consecutive German governments have 
pursued a particular approach to the governance of the Eurozone, namely a rules-
based approach based on nominal targets and sanctioning mechanisms, a low 
degree of risk sharing and very little political discretion. This is not shared by all of 
Germany’s EMU partners.
Ever since the Maastricht negotiations, Germany sought that the integration of 
monetary policy – in the absence of a political union which the French govern-
ment at the time objected to– would be backed by budgetary policy co-ordination 
in order to prevent unsound fiscal policies from undermining monetary stability. 
This resulted in the introduction of the so-called “Excessive Deficit Procedure” into 
the Maastricht Treaty which was supposed to ensure budget-policy surveillance 
and coordination. In 1996, the German government tabled an additional proposal 
which it called the Stability Pact to enhance budgetary policy co-ordination that 
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was deemed insufficient after two years of applying it and even before the euro 
was launched. 
Germany’s traditional concerns are reflected in the position it has presented to the 
so-called Van Rompuy Task Force, which has been set up to sketch out a reform of 
the Eurozone. Focused on this rules-based approach, German political leaders are 
for instance strongly opposed to the creation of a regular Eurozone summit as has 
been repeatedly suggested by the French government. There is a suspicion that 
such an institution and closer co-ordination among the EMU-16 forum could lead 
to more discretionary policies which could contradict Germany’s stability concerns 
and the ECB’s independence. Despite the pressing problems that are unique to the 
Eurozone, the German government’s position is that fiscal and economic gover-
nance should be improved in the EU-27.
Challenges to the German growth model
One of the most sensitive points in the current debate on the Eurozone’s reform 
is how growing economic imbalances as a result of diverging degrees of competi-
tiveness should be tackled. These have been identified as one of the root causes 
of the current Eurozone crisis. There is a broad European consensus that particu-
lar countries with large external deficits need to implement far-reaching structural 
reforms in order to improve their competitiveness.
However, on March 15th 2010, the Eurogroup acknowledged for the first time that 
surpluses also need to be critically reviewed.7 This is a very sensitive point for 
Germany, which has repeatedly been criticised for relying too much on exports and 
too little on domestic demand as engines of growth. Reactions, for instance to the 
interview given by the French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde8 to the Financial 
Times have been emotional.
7 Eurogroup meeting of March 15, 2010, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Rev1clean-ToR_on_
near-term_policy_priorities_of_Europe_2020_in_the_euro_area.pdf
8 Financial Times, Transcript of interview with C. Lagarde, published on March 15 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/78648e1a-3019-11df-8734-00144feabdc0,s01=1.html
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Some critics argue that Germany has pursued a competitive real devaluation as 
unit labour costs have stagnated and reductions of the financial burden on the 
corporate sector have improved its competitiveness. Meanwhile, the increase 
of the VAT to 19 % weighs on domestic consumption. German reactions to such 
criticism are strong as many interpret the debate about imbalances as implying 
that Germany’s partners are asking the country “to do worse”. Comparisons with 
the German football team, which cannot possibly be asked to score less for the 
sake of its neighbours, have been drawn in the public debate,9 and economic per-
formance in the Eurozone is pictured as a competitive race. 
Nevertheless, the question of whether Germany needs to do more for domestic 
demand is today regularly raised in political debates in Berlin. There is a rising 
concern (for instance among some Social Democrat and Green politicians in the 
German Parliament, as a number of public hearings in Parliamentary Committees 
show) that Germany will have to do more for domestic demand in its own interest.10 
There are two major arguments why. Firstly, because Germany has clear self-
interest that the Eurozone finds its way back to a situation of robust growth and 
sustainable public finances for which a strongly growing German economy is a 
prerequisite. Secondly, because if the Eurozone partners substantially increase 
their competitiveness, German as a consequence may lose market share in certain 
segments and will hence have to rely more strongly on domestic growth. 
A new anchor role for Germany?
In recent weeks, Germany has perhaps involuntarily slipped into a new leader-
ship role in the EMU. It has strongly shaped the Eurozone reform debate and sets 
the pace for other member states through its ambitious consolidation agenda. 
Germany’s partners, including France, apparently feel considerable pressure 
to follow Berlin’s policy choices, since markets are sanctioning domestic devel-
opments much more sensitively since the sovereign debt crisis. The intensified 
9 See for instance, H.-O. Solms’ statement in the Economic Committee Hearing of June 16, 2010.
10 See for instance, H. Flassbeck, G. Horn, S. Dullien, “Europa hat noch eine Chance”, in Financial Times 
Deutschland, 05.05.2010, p. 24.
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debate over whether EU countries should introduce domestic fiscal rules somewhat 
similar to Germany’s Schuldenbremse is no coincidence.
There are striking parallels to the pre-EMU situation when Germany’s partners 
shadowed the Bundesbank’s monetary policy in order to maintain exchange-rate 
stability to the Deutschmark. Currently, Germany’s budgetary and economic policy 
decisions raise the stakes for other governments who may diverge in their assess-
ments of suitable policies. Financial markets measure all other governments 
against the German one, as interest spreads between the German government 
bonds and those of its European partners show. If this trend persists, the question 
is how politically sustainable the situation will be in the long run.
Germany may yet again be confronted with a new debate on its responsibility for 
the economic development of the Eurozone. This will not be an easy discussion, 
in particular as its successful growth model is the result of an adaptation process 
based on tough structural reforms, wage restraint and fiscal austerity which were 
justified (and broadly accepted) as a necessary consequence of its own reunifica-
tion and the fact that Germany entered the EMU at an overvalued exchange rate. 
The fact that the Eurozone’s internal divergences may not be solved solely “if 
the others do their homework, too” will require sensitive and far-sighted debate 
between Germany and its EMU partners. A particularly strong role is – again – to 
be taken by France and Germany which add up to 48 % of Eurozone GDP.11 EMU 
member governments will hopefully treat economic and budgetary policies as 
a matter of common concern, as the EU Treaty prescribes, and will understand 
that ensuring growth and convergence in the EMU and guaranteeing the euro’s 
long-term success is a precondition for the well-being of any EMU country.  
11 In Germany, comparatively little attention is paid to the intense debate on the German growth model that 
has developed in France both in the media and in the academic sphere, see for instance, R. Lallement, Le régime 
allemand de croissance tirée par l’exportation : entre succès et remise en cause, Document de Travail, Centre 
d’Analyse Stratégique, mai 2010. http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/07_Doc_Travail_croissance_allemande.
pdf; P. Artus, “La politique économique de l’Allemagne est-elle un problème pour les autres pays européens ?”, 
Natixis Flash, 8 décembre 2009, n° 538.
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III - German Cooperative Capitalism and EU Economic Policy:  
       the Sources of the Tension
hEnrik utErwEddE* (DePuty Director, DeutscH-französiscHes institut, Dfi)
German cooperative capitalism, which seeks to combine economic efficiency with 
social partnership and justice, has been called into question by both global com-
petition and European integration. The response of German society to this double 
challenge has been defined by the attempt to adapt the German model in order to 
preserve its core characteristics. This has led to moderate reformism, oscillating 
between renewal and preservation of the status quo (1).  With regard to European 
integration, growing tension between German collective preferences and European 
initiatives can be observed (2). German society is thus still attached to European 
unification but concerned about the preservation of core German values and policy 
orientations.
The difficult adaptation of German cooperative capitalism
Germany: a stalemate society?
The German post-war economic and social model has three distinguishing features. 
The first is the concept of a social market economy (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), which 
* The author wishes to thank his colleague Joanna Ardizzone for critical reading and useful remarks.
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should be seen as a set of general guidelines for economic policy rather than 
precise instructions for policy. This concept tries to merge a liberal approach to 
markets and competition with a concern for social justice. It fosters social part-
nership both at the firm and the macro level, trying to canalise class conflict into a 
system of social negotiation. The second feature is cooperative “Rhineland capi-
talism”, which has developed institutions and behaviour patterns favouring nego-
tiation, compromise and cooperation in all fields of the economy, in particular 
social partnership in firms (co-determination) and a system of independent col-
lective bargaining at the branch and national levels.  German society has been, 
and remains, strongly attached to this model, which has fostered growth, welfare, 
social cohesion and participation since 1945. The third feature is that the German 
economy has remained more industrially based than that of other European 
countries, with a strong dependency on exports; hence a constant concern about 
the competitiveness of German industry. This competitiveness has been realised in 
qualitative terms (specialisation on high quality products), which makes German 
industry less dependant on cost competitiveness; however, Germany’s historical 
phobia of inflation has led to an propensity to use price stability to help contain 
production costs.
Criticism of this model grew when it began performing less well, undermined by 
the effects of globalisation and reunification. Over-regulation, weaker productivity 
as well as rising labour costs threatened German competitiveness, whilst German 
reunification added to the difficulties through the rising costs of reconstruction 
and a sharp increase in unemployment in Eastern Germany. At the same time, a 
variety of vested interests blocked necessary reforms. Acting within a decision 
system with various “veto players” (the regional Länder governments whose vote 
is necessary for all important reform projects and the interest groups, e.g. trade 
unions and employers’ or industrial associations), neither the Kohl government 
(1982-1998) nor the first Schröder government (1998-2002) were able (or willing) 
to overcome this inertia. Germany seemed to be a victim of its own success in 
the post-war period, having failed to renew its economy and society. Critics saw 
Germany as the sick man of Europe and analysts predicted the end of the German 
model.1 Pressure for liberal reforms went alongside calls for break with the con-
1 W. Streeck, “German Capitalism. Does it exist? Can it survive?”, In C. Crouch and W. Streeck (eds.), Political 
Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping Convergence and Diversity, London: Sage, 1997, p. 33-54. More optimistic: 
H. Uterwedde, “L’avenir du capitalisme allemand”, In H. Stark and M. Weinachter (eds.), L’Allemagne unifiée 20 ans 
après la chute du mur, Villeneuve d’Ascq: Septentrion 2009, p. 35-49.
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sensual, cooperative German model for the reason that it blocked reforms. In 2002 
(21 January) the Financial Times Deutschland ran the headline “Economy does not 
have to be social”, and pointed out that “Germany now needs a period of straight 
capitalism. […] The power of trade unions must be broken. […] We need a dose of 
Thatcherism”.
A (moderate) liberal reform agenda (2003-2005)
When he came to power in 1998, the social democrat Gerhard Schröder flirted with 
New Labour ideas of the “Third Way”, signing a common paper with Tony Blair 
calling for a programmatic renewal of the Left in Europe. In practise, however, 
he continued within the framework of the German model, paying tribute to the 
trade unions and not embarking on reform projects which would have hurt their 
interests. Thus, his “Alliance for jobs”, a tripartite conference series on labour 
market reforms, did not succeed in overcoming mutual vetoes from trade unions 
and business. It was only after the 2002 general election, driven by the worsening 
economic situation, that Schröder launched his programme of structural reforms 
known as the “Agenda 2010”. His reform agenda included important changes in 
the social security system (pensions, health insurance) and in the labour market.2 
The liberal logic of this agenda tried to reduce the level of social contributions and 
thus reduce labour costs, and to introduce more flexibility in to the labour market. 
Conditions for unemployment benefits were toughened in order to give the jobless 
greater incentives to return to work. New paradigms in the social security system 
put a greater emphasis on individual efforts as opposed to collective benefits and 
redefined social justice as equality of chances rather than outcome. Social agree-
ments between trade unions and managements in the main industrial groups went 
in the same direction, allowing more flexibility and wage moderation in order to 
improve competitiveness and safeguard German production sites.
2 B. Lestrade, Les réformes sociales en Allemagne: L’Agenda 2010 du gouvernement Schröder, Note du Cerfa no. 9, 
Paris: Ifri, February 2004, and I. Bourgeois, Le modèle social allemand en mutation, Paris: CIRAC, 2005.
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Deepening the reform policy or back-pedalling? (2005-2010)
The impact of the Schröder reforms is ambiguous. On the one hand, they were 
beneficial to German competitiveness. The German economy profited from the 
recovery in 2005-08, creating a million new jobs.3 Furthermore, they ended discus-
sions about political inertia and the impossibility of reforms in Germany, making 
way for more optimism. On the other hand, they amplified social inequalities. The 
cuts in unemployment benefits in particular provoked a wave of social protest 
which, although it  could not hinder the implementation of the reforms, neverthe-
less led to a growing cleft between the SPD, its voter base and the trade unions, 
and finally to the dramatic electoral defeats of the SPD in following elections. 
In this respect, the outcome of the 2005 general elections is significant: Gerhard 
Schröder lost power, but his campaign to explain the necessity of reforms 
succeeded in limiting the scale of defeat. Indeed, the SPD achieved a result equal 
to its conservative rival, the CDU-CSU. Moreover, the electorate rejected the very 
liberal platform of Angela Merkel (CDU-CSU) and her liberal partner (FDP), forcing 
her to form a coalition with the Social Democrats. The message was that there is 
no political majority for a liberal agenda, and that German society, while admitting 
(reluctantly) the necessity for reform, prefers to stick with the values of the post-war 
cooperative, social capitalism.4
The new coalition (2005-2009) continued with the reform agenda (e.g. raising 
the pension age gradually from 65 to 67 years), but took more and more care to 
soften some aspects of the Schröder reforms. A new emphasis was put on more 
“positive” aspects of the “Agenda 2010”: a new programme (and more money) 
for education, research and innovation, as well as increased family allowances. 
Moreover, the beneficial effects of the 2003 reforms on growth potential, com-
petitiveness and on the labour market became noticeable and helped to stabilise 
public finances. As a reaction to the 2008 financial crisis, the grand coalition set up 
3 See the optimistic view of M. Hüther and B. Scharnagel: “Die Agenda 2010 : eine wirtschaftspolitische Bilanz”, in 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte Nr. 32-33, 2005, p.23-30; more balanced: K. Brenke, “five years after the Reform of 
Social and Unemployment Benefits in Germany”, in Berlin: DIW, Weekly Report Nr. 12/2010, 86-96.
4 Henrik Uterwedde, “The public debate on globalisation in Germany”, in Elvire Fabry (ed.), Europeans and the 
Globalisation Challenge, Paris: Fondation pour l’innovation politique, 2007, p. 63-97.
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a major  Keynesian deficit spending programme, and together with business and 
trade unions, it worked out a cooperative (and costly) plan to avoid redundancies.
The new conservative-liberal coalition: a big misunderstanding
The outcome of the 2009 general elections, favourable to the CDU-CSU and even 
more so to the liberal party (FDP), allowed Angela Merkel to form a conservative-
liberal government. However, the new coalition got off to a bad start. It seems 
that the government is the fruit of a big misunderstanding: the CDU-CSU, having 
learned from its 2005-2009 governmental experience, has learnt to compromise 
on social concerns in the population, “softened” its programme and adopted a 
moderate social conservatism. The FDP, without governmental experience since 
1998, has reinforced its economic liberalism and upper-class clientelism. Whereas 
the CDU-CSU has tried to be responsive to the global monetary crisis, calling for 
more regulation, and to the attachment of German society to social capitalism, 
the liberals have stuck to their classic demands (massive tax cuts, liberalisation 
of the labour market and of the social security system), which have lost much of 
their attraction. 
The result has been a climate of growing disharmony, distrust, and conflict between 
the two coalition partners. They have also lost the important regional election in 
North-Rhine-Westphalia (18 million inhabitants). The dramatic loss of political 
leadership could lead the Merkel government to delay, or even abandon, all con-
flictual reform projects. 
German society and the European model: how to compromise
From permissive consensus to growing disaffection?
Traditionally, German society has been very favourable to European integration 
since 1945. The loss of national identity after the Nazi dictatorship and German 
division in 1948 led to nationalism being held responsible for the catastrophe of 
World War II. The search for new respectability led West German governments to 
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have a strong commitment to European unity (which sometimes seemed to serve 
as an ersatz for a missing national identity) and to an active engagement in the 
integration process. For a long period, German society was characterised by a “per-
missive consensus” in favour of European unity, backing all governmental initia-
tives to deepen European integration. This did not prevent critical debates, mainly 
when it came to financial or economic issues. The common agricultural policy, for 
example, has always been fairly unpopular, and Germany’s “paymaster role” (the 
high German net contribution to the EU budget) has been a recurrent theme in the 
media since the 1970s. On the whole, however, German society felt “in phase” 
with the course of European integration, which was compatible with the German 
model of capitalism and benefited the German export-led economy. 
Since reunification in 1990, commitment to Europe has been weakened, while still 
remaining at a high level. New domestic concerns have predominated, such as 
the implementation and financing of German unity. The search for a new German 
role in international politics has led to a greater articulation of German national 
interests than in the past. European monetary union has never been popular in 
German society and fears over the danger of inflation and uncontrollable sovereign 
debts have been voiced. However, in the context of German reunification and 
with Chancellor Kohl’s strong commitment to monetary union, the permissive 
consensus has worked: no notable political opposition to the euro has developed.
However, the intensification of European economic integration (single market 
and monetary union) has led to growing and critical concern. The compatibility of 
European rules and policies with German preferences has been put into question. 
Since the outbreak of the worldwide financial crisis in 2008, controversies between 
the German government and main European partners, in particular France, have 
amplified. Issues have been the European plan to save banks, a common European 
economic recovery policy, the installation of a European “economic government”, 
financial aid for the Greek government, the criticism of the German export-led 
growth model, the “excessive” German balance of trade surplus, and the future 
shape of stability rules within the European monetary union. The German govern-
ment has been accused more than once, notably in France, of rejecting common 
European solutions and of turning its back on Europe. 
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Attachment to national preferences
It is not the principle of European integration per se which is questioned in German 
society but the contents of specific policies. In many ways, the reserved attitudes 
of the German government towards current European initiatives reflect collective 
preferences which are strongly based in German society. Principles such as the 
independence of the European Central Bank or the necessity of price stability and 
balanced budgets are considered a priority by a large majority of citizens. 
As for the Greek budget crisis, a recent opinion poll reveals that aid to Greece is 
extremely unpopular.5 It is obvious that Germans fear damaging effects of the 
“irresponsible” behaviour of some European partners, plead for harder rules, and 
want more effective sanctions for rule-breakers. On the other hand, a majority of 
Germans favour European, rather than national, responses to the current crisis 
(see the contribution of Stefan Seidendorf in this volume).
National choices and European integration
In a general way, it seems that the current controversies between the French and 
the German governments point to differences in the respective collective prefer-
ences of the two societies. When Angela Merkel rejects an economic government 
for the euro zone which would interfere with governmental choices on national 
economic policy, she may be sure that there is a strong consensus in German 
society. The example of the dramatic public reactions in Germany to the question-
ing of the German export-led growth model by French finance minister Christine 
Lagarde shows that a large majority of Germans are not willing to abandon an 
economic model which ensures employment for a substantial part of the labour 
force. If experts close to the left and trade unions also starting to question the 
German export-led model,6 the impact of this debate on public policy is limited. 
5 IFOP: Les Européens face à la crise grecque – Résultats détaillés. Etude réalisée pour la Fondation pour l’innovation 
politique (Fondapol), http://www.fondapol.org/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/sondage/Sondage-Europeens-face-crise-
grecque-resultats-complets-FR.pdf (13.6.2010).
6 See G. Horn and al., Einseitige Exportorientierung belastet Wachstum – Frankreich besser als Deutschland, IMK 
Policy Brief, 24 March 2010, Düsseldorf: Hans Böckler Stiftung, or K. Busch, Gouvernement économique européen et 
coordination des politiques salariales – la crise de la zone euro appelle des réformes structurelles, Paris: Friedrich-
Ebert-Stiftung, May 2010 (http://www.fesparis.org/common/pdf/publications/Wirtschaftsregierung.pdf).
28 - WHere is Germany HeaDinG?
Given the growing concern for more social balance, perceptible in the current 
political climate, pressure for higher wages and income could rise in the forthcom-
ing months and years, but this will be led by internal dynamics much more than by 
European considerations.
German society is not so much raising a barrier against Europe, but sticking to its 
fundamental principles, as do other societies too. European integration is interfer-
ing more and more directly not only with national policies but also with the funda-
mental collective choices and preferences of national societies. This suggests that 
there are serious problems ahead with the acceptance and legitimacy of European 
policies. Without a convincing answer to these problems, further progress in inte-
gration will be unlikely.
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IV - German Public Opinion and EU Membership     
stEfan sEidEndorf (HeaD ot tHe eu DePartment, DeutscH-französiscHes institut, Dfi)
 
Comments on an alleged ‘shift’ towards a transformation of Germany’s ‘position’ 
or ‘role’ within the European Union (EU) usually focus on the behaviour of German 
elites. Attention is directed towards political, economic and administrative actors. 
We know relatively little about the feeling of ‘ordinary’ German citizens on questions 
of European integration. Has their perception of the EU changed over the past 
decade? Are we witnessing a ‘Euroscepticism’ comparable to what we see in 
other EU member states?1 To tackle this question, I present some general insights 
provided by recent survey data (1), before presenting some insights that can be 
gained from an analytical framework linking public debates, public opinion and 
political leadership (2).
Survey data and German public perception of the European Union
The main survey instrument for studying public opinion and citizens’ perceptions 
of the EU, the European Commission’s Eurobarometer, groups within its ‘standard 
1 D. Della Porta, Social Movements and the European Union: Eurosceptics or Critical Europeanists?, Policy Paper 
N°22, Paris: Notre Europe, 2006.
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version’ (asked twice a year) a range of general questions under the headings “per-
ception of the European Union” and “image of the European Union”.2 The answers 
give a first hint to the question of whether the perception of the EU has changed in 
Germany during recent years or months. The fieldwork for EB 72 (autumn 2009) was 
done from October to November 2009, before the height of the Euro crisis in spring 
2010. 60% of Germans (53% of Europeans) think that their country’s EU member-
ship is a good thing and 57% of Germans (57% of Europeans) believe that their 
country has benefited from EU membership. No major change in this judgement has 
occurred during recent years. Concerning the ‘image of the EU’ and the ‘personal 
associations with the EU’, Germans are more critical then in the preceding assess-
ment, yet share this feeling with other Europeans.3 Eurobarometer’s ‘qualita-
tive’ surveys, dealing with the EU’s ‘image’ and citizen’s expectations concerning 
the ‘future of Europe’, largely corroborate the overall results of the quantitative 
studies: the EU has by and large a positive image, and participation and integra-
tion into the EU are seen as beneficial for Germany, as well as for the individual 
citizen.4 
According to these results, Germany is comparable to other founding members 
of the EU. If one takes a closer look in order to find some differences, German 
citizens are more critical towards the EU’s bureaucracy and ‘wasting of money’ and 
they fear the consequences of the current financial and economic crisis in a more 
sustained manner than their neighbours. This is not enough to mean a particularly 
negative perception of the EU and the integration process in Germany, but it rather 
shows that the ‘permissive consensus’ of the early years has been replaced by a 
differentiated view. A recent comparative survey on “Les Européens face à la crise 
grecque” (Europeans and the Greek crisis),5 with fieldwork done during the height 
of the Greek crisis in France, Germany, UK, Spain and Italy (12-19 March 2010), 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/standard_en.htm
3 47% of Germans, 48% of Europeans had a good image of the EU. On the negative side, 37% of Germans link 
the EU to bureaucracy, 34% to a ‘waste of money’, whereas only 20 and 21% of their fellow Europeans share this 
perception. Germans appreciate the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU (57%), a point shared by 
46% of all Europeans. 
4 “Perceptions of the European Union – a Qualitative study of the Public’s Attitudes to and Expectations of the 
European Union in 15 Member States and in 9 Candidate Countries“, Study by Optem S.A.R.L. for the European 
Commission 2001, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/quali/ql_perceptions_summary_en.pdf (08.06.2010) and 
“The European Citizens and the Future of Europe – Qualitative study among citizens in the 25 member states”, Study 
by Optem S.A.R.L. for the DG Communication of the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
quali/ql_futur_en.pdf (08.06.2010). 
5 IFOP (2010): « Les Européens face à la crise grecque – Résultats détaillés », étude réalisée pour la Fondation 
pour l’Innovation Politique (Fondapol), http://www.fondapol.org/fileadmin/uploads/pdf/sondage/Sondage-
Europeens-face-crise-grecque-EN.pdf (11.06.10)
WHere is Germany HeaDinG? - 31
Studies &
79
Research
confirms this point: a general reluctance to help Greece “in the name of European 
solidarity”,6 or to support a general “European tax” to help EU member states in 
trouble7, contrasts with the answer to the question of where the current economic 
crisis should be solved, at the national or the European level. A majority in favour 
of more European solutions exists only in Germany (52%), whereas citizens of 
the other countries prefer national solutions (F 54%, Esp 75%, It 53%, UK 75%). 
The key to this seemingly paradoxical attitude lies in the German understanding 
of the Greek crisis: 78% of German respondents hold the Greek government for 
responsible of the Greek crisis, a feeling that is shared to a lesser degree by other 
Europeans (F 57%, Esp 59%, It 44%, UK 56%).
These findings suggest that notwithstanding the current row about the Eurozone 
crisis, the German public should not be considered to be more Eurosceptic or Euro-
hostile in general than other Europeans. Germans see the Greek crisis as a Greek, 
not a European one. They are against “paying for Greece”, not against further 
European integration in general. Further integration may even include enhanced 
contributions to the European budget, as a last question confirms. Asked if they 
were ready to spend more for common European projects and less for only national 
projects, even at the price of reduced ‘national sovereignty’, not only 76% French, 
72% Spanish and 77% Italian, but also 61% German citizens are in favour of such 
a solution. Only a British majority of 55% is against an enhanced common budget. 
Linking political leadership, the role of the media and public 
opinion 
To explain this particular picture, we may have to refine our understanding of 
“public opinion”. If public opinion were a mere aggregation of individual opinions, 
electoral or referendum campaigns should be without influence. Individuals would 
vote according to their individual interests. The ‘structural variables’ (gender, age, 
class, social or political preferences) would explain the outcome. However, a look 
at the evolution of public opinion during recent referendum campaigns shows that 
6 76% of Germans and 78% of British citizens are opposed to this, but only 47% of French and 33 % Italian citizens.
7 Not only opposed by 82% of Germans, but also by 73% of French and British and even 45% Spaniards and 44% of 
Italians, citizens of countries who potentially could benefit from such a tax.
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this view does not hold. The majorities for or against a proposed EU treaty fre-
quently changed during campaigns. This evolution cannot be explained by the sole 
existence of structural variables. Rather, the intervening effect of public debate, 
media and political campaigns must be considered.8 If we apply this general 
statement to the German case, we can ask what are the driving factors behind the 
German debate on the integration process and the perception of the European 
Union? Here, a distinction must be made between a ‘European level’ that sets 
the larger topics of the debate and the particular ‘national framing’ of the debate, 
which identifies and concentrates on ‘salient’ issues with regard to the national 
constellation.9 Concerning the European level, the larger stage is provided by the 
recent financial and economic crisis and its repercussions on Greece and, subse-
quently, on the rest of the Euro member states. Yet by enlarging this short-term per-
ception, we must also take into account two more long-term evolutions that have 
structured the debate on European Union over the last years: one is the process of 
eastern enlargement of the EU, the other the internal process of ‘constitutionalisa-
tion’ of the EU. 
Enlargement was largely seen as a historical ‘necessity’ and, in the official 
discourse, linked to the opportunities it provided for German business.10 On 
the other side, public fears were expressed at the highest level of the state, for 
example in Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s unilateral restrictions of one of the 
EU’s four fundamental freedoms, namely free movement. Only after seven years 
of EU membership would citizens from the new member states be entitled to live 
and work in Germany. A second fear was linked to Germany’s perceived role as 
Zahlmeister, as major contributor to the EU budget. Another famous Schröder’s 
quotation was that he would object to ‘burning German money’ in Brussels. These 
are, of course, anecdotic illustrations, yet they shed light on an underlying phe-
nomenon: an absence of public debate does not mean that people do not have an 
opinion and discuss European topics. However, without political or elite guidance 
and lacking institutionalised fora, such public opinion is most probably linked 
to fears, stereotypes and generalising resentments. In this respect Chancellor 
8 C.H. De Wreese, “Context, Elites, Media and Public Opinion in Referendums: When Campaigns really matter.”, In 
C.H. de Vresse (ed.), The Dynamics of Referendum Campaigns. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 1-20.
9 U. Liebert and H.-J.Trenz, “Mass media and contested meanings: EU constitutional politics after popular rejection”, 
in EUI Working Papers RSCAS N°2008/28, 2008.
10 F. Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, an the Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union”, in International Organisation 55:1, 2001, pp. 47-80.
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Schröder quotations touched upon a public ill-feeling that exists in Germany. Very 
generally, it seems to be made up of fear concerning future developments that 
may lie out of national control and are linked to material loss (compare with the 
‘fear’ expressed in opinion surveys, above). It could give rise to an identity debate 
based on “we-them” opposition.
A similar argument can be made in relation to the institutional debate of the last 
decade. The fact that in Germany the ratification of recent treaty changes was not 
linked to a political debate does not mean that Germans were not exposed to 
and integrated into Europe-wide public debate on the subject. On the one hand, 
there may be more of a ‘European public sphere’ than we suspect.11 The major 
events of the process of constitutionalisation, especially the solemn declarations 
and hard bargaining nights of heads of state and government, were covered by 
national media, as were the ‘referendum battles’ in France, the Netherlands and 
Ireland. As in other founding-member countries, the ultimate treaty changes let 
down the normative expectations initially generated by the ‘process of constitu-
tionalisation’. Yet on top of that, in the German case, we find the frustration that 
‘we the people’ were not allowed to ratify these treaty changes, unlike the French 
or Dutch or Irish populations. If we turn to the ‘post-referendum process’ and its 
media representation, we find a framing in more intergovernmental and national 
colours. This is not surprising, but rather the usual framing of the summits of 
heads of state and government. It is clearly due to the institutional structure of 
these meetings, where bargaining, horse-trading and package deals in the early 
hours are the usual procedure. The media representation insists on the national 
representative’s ‘performance’, on the defence of ‘national interest’ or the ‘sacri-
fices’ that were conceded at the last minute. Yet linked to growing public attention, 
this framing may in term lead to a situation where the usual left-right cleavage 
of politics is replaced by a dichotomisation along national lines, fostering sepa-
ratist tendencies amongst the EU member states. The recent debates around the 
Greek and Euro crises fit perfectly with this picture: ‘We’ (Germans) have to defend 
our money against ‘them’ (Greeks), people who ‘defrauded’ in order to ‘gain’ our 
national currency. This is the setting for an identity debate, and it is the particu-
lar role of the German currency (Deutsche Mark) as an identity marker, described 
11 U. Liebert,  “Introduction: structuring political conflict about Europe: national media in trans-national discourse 
analysis”, in Perspectives on European Politics and Society 8:3, 2007, pp.235-260.
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by various scholars, which is in question here.12 However, without a political 
debate it is difficult to see what actors and events could trigger such a change. As 
mentioned above, no referendum or election campaign on European topics took 
place in Germany. The main parties continue to paint an uncontroversial picture 
of European politics (though Die Linke, the far-left party, takes a more confronta-
tional stance on topics of European politics and voted against the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty). 
In the German case, the rulings of the Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe and the 
debates that developed around these rulings may be compared to the catalytic 
role that EU referenda took on in other EU member states: as it is known, the Court 
regularly expressed democratic and normative concerns against the prospect 
of an ever closer integration and unsurprisingly, the ‘emergency mechanism’ 
invented to deal with the Greek Euro-crisis will again be brought before the Court.13 
Important with regard to this paper’s argument is again the media coverage and 
the ensuing public perception of the Court’s role. The ‘usual’ claimants are mainly 
members of academia, professors of law and economics. Traditionally, they are 
held in high esteem within a German society that nowadays is permanently looking 
for ‘experts’ expressing (seemingly) substantial opinions on difficult questions. 
The Constitutional Court itself, together with the federal president (and the old 
Bundesbank!), can claim the highest support in terms of confidence and trust 
by German citizens. Without political debate and political leadership, the public 
may turn to these highly esteemed institutions that permanently seem to defend 
German democracy and sovereignty against ‘Brussels bureaucratic bulimia’. Once 
again this could lead to an identity debate that questions the existence of the inte-
gration project in its current form. 
Conclusion: Public euroscepticism without public debate?
Drawing together my arguments allows for a differentiated conclusion. On 
the one hand, survey data corroborates neither the existence of fundamental 
12 T. Risse, D. Engelmann-Martin, H.-J. Knopf, and K. Roscher, “To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics 
in the European Union”, in European Journal of International Relations 5:2, 1999, pp. 147-187.
13 A. Fischer-Lescano, J. Christian and W. Arndt (eds.), The German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling: Legal and 
Political Science Perspectives, in ZERP discussion paper, University of Bremen, 2010. 
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Euroscepticism in the German population nor the hypothesis of a transforma-
tion or shift in its perception of the European Union. On the other hand, looking 
beneath survey data leads to a more sceptical view: if there is no institutional or 
political provision that would allow for a controversial public and political debate 
on the European Union in Germany, this does not mean that such a debate does 
not exist. Germany is part of the process of growing EU politicisation, and this 
includes a differentiated view of ‘the EU’. One can be in favour of ‘further integra-
tion’ and still oppose emergency aid or financial transfers to Greece. However, the 
fact that this debate is subconscious may contain dangerous potential: without 
political leadership and framing, the debate is reduced to expressions of fear, ste-
reotypes and resentments. This can provide the grounds for an ‘identity debate’ 
that opposes a national ‘us’ against a diffuse European / global / foreign ‘them’. 
Linked to the emotional potential inherent in identity markers (the currency, the 
Constitutional Court) and dealing with questions of ‘constitutional politics’ (of the 
EU), Germany’s apparently clement public opinion may well follow the trajecto-
ry in other Eurosceptic member states. However, such a movement would need a 
political leader. Even if some Christian Democrat voices seem to fear the develop-
ment of a conservative, nationalist and populist force right of the CDU, no such a 
development is currently in sight. 
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V - Germany and the EU’s External Policies
timo BEhr (researcHer at tHe finnisH institute of international affairs)
The normality debate
Ever since Germany’s unification two decades ago observers of German foreign 
affairs have been enthralled by a singular question: has Germany become a more 
“normal” actor in international affairs? And if so, what has been the impact of 
this normality?1 The debate about German “normality” is framed by a particular 
academic view of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy disposition. Most analysts 
agree that during the Cold War the FRG had broken with its militaristic past and 
turned into a different kind of international power whose foreign policy objectives 
were based on compromise and reconciliation.
As a “civilian power”, Germany took on the role of an international bridge-builder 
that placed the pursuit of an “exaggerated multilateralism” over its own national 
self-interests.2 Germany’s overall foreign policy objective was to promote a civilis-
1 S. Harnisch & H. W. Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2001; S. Erb, German foreign policy: navigating a new era, Boulder: L. Rienner, 2003; 
A.-M. Le Gloannec, “The Unilateralist Temptation: Germany’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War”, Internationale 
Politik und Gesellschaft 1, 2004.
2 P. J. Katzenstein, Tamed Power: German in Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.
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ing of international affairs by building multilateral networks of international gov-
ernance. Among the hallmarks of this foreign policy approach were an ardent 
pacifism, an emphasis on reconciliation, a policy of self-restraint on the interna-
tional stage, and above all an unswerving commitment to the European project.3 
The latter was clearly articulated by the epitaph of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
Germany’s long-time Foreign Minister, that “Germany has no national interests, 
because its interests are identical with Europe.”
All of this made Germany into an ardent supporter of a more integrated European 
foreign policy. The FRG strongly backed the development of European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) and later was equally supportive of the development of the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht. Germany also generally 
abstained from taking unilateral action on the international stage, but preferred 
to pursue its national interests through common European initiatives. Moreover, 
despite being a staunch supporter of a more ambitious and integrated CFSP, 
Germany adopted a rather passive stance and willingly ceded leadership on CFSP 
issues to other European countries. While German passivity made it an uncompli-
cated partner within the EU, it also raised questions about burden sharing, espe-
cially in international crisis management operations.
With the end of the Cold War unified Germany’s foreign policy orientation has been 
undergoing a gradual transformation that for many indicated a shift away from this 
traditional role as a civilian power. In the process, Germany is assumed to have 
become a more “normal” European country that pursues an expanding set of inter-
national interest with increasing self-confidence.4 The source of this transforma-
tion is contested. While some analysts have seen it primarily as a reaction to the 
changing structures of international politics and the nature of the European Union, 
others have argued that Germany’s normalisation relates to its new domestic 
context and political culture.
But whatever the source of these changes, German “normality” has had an over-
whelmingly negative connotation. The prospects of a more self-confident and sta-
3 U. Krotz, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany compared”, Working Paper 2(1), 
Cambridge, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University,2002.
4 R. Karp, “The New German Foreign Policy Consensus”, The Washington Quarterly 29(1), 2006.
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tus-oriented Germany claiming a larger international role once again has raised the 
specter of a new “German Problem” in Europe. When it comes to the EU’s external 
policies, a more activist and less compromising Germany is seen as undermin-
ing the development of EU external relations. Germany’s uncompromising position 
during the Iraq crisis and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s insistence that “German 
interests are made in Berlin and nowhere else” have been widely seen as a 
watershed in this regards. But is Germany’s “normalisation” really undermining 
the development of CFSD and CSDP? 
Genscher’s children: Germany & CFSP
For most of the 1990s, the foreign policy of reunified Germany seemed to differ 
little from that of the FRG. Under Kohl’s conservative-liberal coalition, Germany 
continued to buttress the institutional development of CFSP and accepted a minor 
role in international affairs. Even when called upon to live up to its new status – as 
happened during the Gulf War and the Balkan crisis – Germany used its financial 
wealth and culture of pacifism to excuse itself from taking a more active role. The 
few occasion on which unified Germany seemed to stray from this trajectory – 
such as its unilateral recognition of Croatia – were quickly dismissed as rooted in 
Germany’s complex history and EU incompetence.5
To many observes the real shift in Germany’s foreign policy only appeared with the 
onset of the red-green coalition government in the late 1990s. The new coalition 
displayed an unknown willingness to defend Germany’s “national interests” and 
no longer seemed to pursue multilateralism and a deepening of European integra-
tion as goals in and of themselves. In foreign affairs this became most obvious in 
the German government’s determined “Nein” to the Iraq War and in its unilateral 
pursuit of a closer partnership with Russia.6 In both cases the red-green coalition 
government was seen as placing narrow domestic interests over the requirements 
of European solidarity.
5 B. Crawford, “German Foreign Policy and European Political Cooperation: The Diplomatic Recognition of Croatia”, 
German Politics and Society 13(1), 1995.
6 P. Rudolf, “The Myth of the German Way: German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations”, Survival 47(1), 2007; 
R. Götz, “Germany and Russia – Strategic Partner?”, Geopolitical Affairs 4, 2007.
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While initially dismissed as a populist move by a single individual, succes-
sive German governments have shown to be similarly combative in defending 
Germany’s perceived national interests and have continued to pursue a more 
activist foreign policy agenda. Under Angela Merkel Germany’s foreign policy 
rhetoric might have been more conciliatory; but in substance there have been few 
differences. Gone are the unquestioning and unconditional German commitment 
to European and transatlantic solidarity and the willingness to leave the directing 
of the EU’s international fortunes to others. While Germany continues to back the 
CFSP, it now demands more of a say in determining its direction. The impact of this 
change has been mixed for the EU.
The areas where greater German assertiveness has perhaps been most directly 
felt concerns the EU’s relationship with Russia and the post-Soviet space.7 Here 
Germany’s leadership claim is primarily seen as having a negative impact, as it 
is thought to have zapped the EU’s resolve when being confronted with Russia’s 
reviving imperialism. As a result of its trade and energy dependence, Germany has 
shown a tendency to engage in direct deals with Russia that ignore the well-found-
ed concerns of many Central and Eastern European member states. Examples for 
this policy abound. Whether it comes to the controversial Baltic Gas Pipeline, the 
brokering of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Merkel’s rejection of 
fast-track NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, or the recent joint proposal 
for an EU-Russia security committee, Germany is seen as riding roughshod over the 
concerns of other EU countries.
Of course, Germany is not the only EU country that favours a conciliatory approach 
towards Russia, and German Ostpolitik and its strategy of “hedged cooperation 
and integration”8 have deep roots, but Berlin’s policy is widely seen as complicat-
ing the EU’s attempt to adopt a more coordinated approach towards Russia. Most 
notably, Germany’s dependence on Russian gas has hindered the development 
of a more integrated EU external energy policy. More recently, German reticence 
seems to have become less acute of an issue in this regard. French, Dutch and 
Italian companies have now joined German companies in the divisive North and 
7 S. F Szabo, “Can Berlin and Washington Agree on Russia?”, The Washington Quarterly 32(4), 2009; C. Chivvis and 
T. Rid, “The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy”, Survival 51(2), 2009.
8 P. Rudolf, “Towards a Common Transatlantic Strategy in Dealing with Russia?”, SWP Comments 22, Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2008.
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South Stream pipeline projects and a thawing of Polish-Russian relations has 
meant that a deepening of EU-Russian energy ties is being more widely supported.
And yet, the recent spat between Russia and the EU over Belarus has again shown 
that energy security remains a blind spot for the EU.
While this has been acknowledged in Berlin, for now there seems to be little 
appetite in Germany for placing the fate of Germany’s gas-hungry industry into the 
hands of Brussels.
At the same time, German leadership and support have been instrumental for the 
development of the EU’s policies in other parts of the post-Soviet space, including 
Berlin’s support for the Eastern Partnership initiative and its promotion of a 
common EU strategy for Central Asia. Given a lack of interest by other EU countries, 
German activism has served as a catalyst for common EU initiatives on these 
issues. Here, Germany has increasingly played a more positive role which is similar 
to that of France in the Mediterranean.
While greater German activism and assertiveness have had a somewhat mixed 
impact on EU policies in the East, their effect tended to be more benign elsewhere. 
One result has been that Germany has become more involved in regions where 
it has traditionally been absent – including the Middle East and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Here German activism and the development of a more comprehensive 
“Weltanschauung” have been mostly a boon, providing EU policies with greater 
weight.9 In the Middle East, Berlin has shown greater willingness to support a 
common EU line in the peace process and has placed European and transatlantic 
solidarity over its traditionally close business ties with Iran. Germany’s approach 
in most cases has also tended to favour a strong role for the common EU institu-
tions, as shown by Merkel’s determined opposition to the Mediterranean Union 
and German support for the further development of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy.
9 G. Steinberg, “German Middle East and North Africa Policy: Interests, Strategies, Options”, SWP Research Paper/
RP 09, September 2009.
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Finally, when it comes to the institutional development of the CFSP, German 
“normality” had only a mild impact. During the Constitutional Convention 
Germany endorsed the idea of a European Foreign Minister and the development 
of a European External Action Service (EEAS). But while accepting the leadership of 
others on this issue, Germany has sought to ensure that its interests would be ade-
quately represented within the new service. In a leaked diplomatic note from spring 
201010, Germany attacked British overrepresentation in the EEAS and Germany’s 
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle (unsuccessfully) campaigned to have German 
accepted as an official language. On most other issues concerning the institution-
al set-up of the EEAS or the EU’s embattled High Representative Catherine Ashton, 
Germany has followed the lead of others.
The end of innocence: Germany & the CSDP
When it comes to Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), greater 
German “normality” has largely had a positive impact. Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s unified Germany slowly parted with its dogmatic opposition to the use of 
force and has displayed a greater willingness to carry its share of the burden in 
international crisis management operations.11 While the development of the CSDP 
emerged from a Franco-British compromise, it was given its initial institutional 
framing during Germany’s EU Presidency. Since then, Germany has continued to 
be a staunch supporter of the CSDP and participated in a number of CSDP opera-
tions, including some “out-of-area” operations in Congo and the Gulf of Aden.
Germany has also consistently backed a greater European role in international 
crisis management issues. Since the Iraq crisis Germany has moderated its long-
standing preference for NATO as Europe’s primary security organisations and has 
backed greater independence for the EU in defence matters – including the setting 
up of an EU planning capacity. More than on CFSP matters, Germany has also 
tended to give primacy to European solidarity over national concerns or grand-
10 A. Rettman, “Germany attacks UK over diplomatic service”, EUObserver, 1 March 2010.
11 H. Maull, “Germany and the use of force: still a civilian power?”, Survival 42(2), 2000; K. Longhurst, Germany 
and the use of force: The evolution of German security policy 1990-2003, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2004.
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standing when it concerned the CSDP. Germany has opted to integrate its forces 
into several joint EU Battlegroups, rather than insisting on putting together an indi-
vidual one and has lent its support to EU operations even when it disagreed with 
them in principal – such as in case of Eufor Chad.
Besides all of this, Germany’s transition to become a more active security actor 
has not been without complications. In more than one case, Germany’s European 
partners have complained about its reluctance to contribute its part to high-end 
military operations and for maintaining stringent national caveats on the use 
of force. Moreover, the unfamiliarity of the German public with crisis manage-
ment operations and its still deep-rooted pacifism have meant that Germany can 
sometimes be an uncertain partner in this regard. Especially Germany’s loss of 
innocence in Afghanistan has been a difficult issue for the public and has strength-
ened a domestic urge towards isolationism.12 All in all, the CSDP seems to have 
therefore benefited from Germany’s “normalisation”.
Post-Lisbon Germany: stepping stone or stumbling block?
Overall, Germany’s transition to becoming a more “normal” international actor 
seems to have a dual effect for the EU’s external policies. On the one hand it has 
meant that Germany has become more assertive within the EU about defending 
its own perceived national interests and more status-oriented when it comes to 
international affairs. While Germany does not contest the principal of EU foreign 
policy cooperation and remains a staunch supporter of the CFSP and CSDP, it now 
demands a greater say in determining their direction. This has created problems 
in areas where German interests have clashed with those of other EU member 
states – especially over Russia. However, even here Germany continues to prefer 
common EU solutions and compromise over unilateral initiatives.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that greater German activism on foreign 
and defencee issues has also strengthened EU policies in some regards. Germany 
has taken leadership on developing EU policies on some previously neglected 
12 T. Behr, “Germany”,  in T. Archer and al, Afghanistan’s Hard Summer: The Role of European troop contributing 
nations, UPI Briefing Paper 43, 2009.
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regions and greater German involvement has been beneficial for EU policies in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. Indeed, when it comes to CSDP, more rather than less 
German “normality” seems to be desirable. All of this shows that as far as the EU’s 
external relations are concerned, Germany’s normalisation did not have a singular-
ly negative effect. As always, where the balance lies is difficult to judge. However, 
if the EU wants to become a truly global player, a more grown-up Germany might 
not be such a bad thing after all.
WHere is Germany HeaDinG? - 45
Studies &
79
Research
VI - Between the Rhineland and the English Channel 
william E. PatErson (Honorary Professor of German anD euroPean Politics, aston centre 
for euroPe, aston university)
 
Germany together with France has played a key role in the development of 
European integration. Among the large powers Germany has been  notable for the 
strength of  its European vocation – a vocation which has come under increasing 
pressure. This article will analyse the pressures on this European vocation  and the 
way in which German European policy has become less inclusive, more centred 
on a narrow national interest.1The title alludes to Germany’s traditional European 
vision and the implications of some elements of its current policy and concludes 
that  the adoption of a British type EU policy is  neither in Germany’s nor the EU’s 
interest.
The erosion of the European vocation
German European policy rested internally on an elite pro-European consensus 
which had lasted since the late 1950’s. This elite consensus and the low saliency 
1 W.E. Paterson, “Does Germany Still Have a European Vocation?”, German Politics, Vol 19, No 1, March 2010, 
pp41-52.
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of EU issues allowed a very high degree of elite autonomy. This high degree of elite 
autonomy combined with the strength of the German economy allowed Germany 
to pursue an inclusive European policy  and to be the key coalition maker in the 
European Union, normally on the basis of a Franco –German agreement. This has 
been  a notably successful policy both for Germany and the European Union  but 
has however come under increasing strain.
Internal pressures
Germany’s European vocation was shaped and sustained by the European visions 
of successive Chancellors, notably those of Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl.2 
These visions were informed by direct personal  experience of the Third Reich and 
the necessity  of learning from that terrible episode in German history. Inevitably 
that imperative weakens as generations without direct personal experience recon-
stitute the political class. Generational change is not all encompassing and 
Joschka Fischer retained and developed a European vision but neither of the two 
most recent Chancellors have had a European vision. Gerhard Schröder developed 
a strategic relationship with Russia and whereas a Kohl speech would always refer 
to being born in a border area, Chancellor Merkel’s negative reference point is her 
upbringing in a dictatorship and she has relied on a reputation for problem solving 
and brokering  rather than ’vision’, but this leaves her dangerously exposed when 
problems prove intractable.
Lawyers and legal norms remain central to the operation of  German politics and 
the Federal Constitutional Court enjoys a very high standing. Its judgement on the 
30th of June 2009 on the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty will therefore have a 
profound long-term effect on the discourse and future scope of German European 
policy.3 It set limits to future integration policy by specifying a number of areas 
where the state should retain sovereignty. It also called for a strengthening of the 
control powers of the Bundestag especially in relation to the Treaty’s ‘passerelle’ 
clauses. The ruling also required that the Bundestag pass an accompanying act. 
2 W.E.Paterson, “Helmut Kohl, the ‘Vision Thing’and Escaping the Semi Sovereignty”, Trap Vol 7, No 1, March 1998, 
pp 17-36. 
3 A.L.Barriere and B Rousel, Le traité de Lisbonne, étape ultime de l’intégration européenne ? Le Jugement du 30 juin 
2009 de la Cour Constitutionelle Allemande, Paris: Institut francais des relations internationales, Note du Cerfa, 
66, 2009.
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Whilst an attempt by the CSU to impose a set of provisions which would have sig-
nificantly further constrained the autonomy of the executive in this area failed, it is 
apparent that the FCC is contributing to a limited party-politicisation of EU policy.
European integration has very largely been a fair-weather creation and Germany’s 
support was strongest during the so-called ‘fetten Jahre’s (prosperous years). 
The impact of German unity has produced a ‘resource crunch’ which makes it 
much more difficult than in the past to underwrite European integration.4 These 
pressures have dramatically increased as a result of the euro crisis which will have 
a major impact on the German budget.
For over two decades mass opinion in Germany was less enthusiastic than elite 
opinion but  had little discernible impact on an inclusive European policy.
Elite and mass views continue to diverge but the prevailing elite consensus and the 
relatively low salience of European issues has allowed continued elite autonomy. 
The question is for how long?5
The euro crisis has finally answered this question with the potential impact of the 
Greek bail-out on the German budget, the deep hostility of public opinion reflected 
in the Land election of North Rhine Westphalia  and a determined campaign by 
the Bild Zeitung giving European policy a high saliency, which is likely to be main-
tained as the unfolding crisis makes further demands on the German taxpayer .This 
combination of a very hostile press and public opinion led to a very significant 
erosion of  the party political consensus in the Bundestag debate on support for 
the Greek bail out on 21 May, where the main opposition parties for the first time 
in a number of decades refused to support the government position.
4 W. Streeck, “Endgame?The Fiscal Crisis of the German State”, in A. Miskimmon , W.E. Paterson , J. Sloam (eds) 
The Gathering Crisis: The 2005 Federal  Election  and the Grand Coalition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, 
pp 38-63.
5 W.E. Paterson , ”European Policy Making : Between Associated Sovereignty and Semi Sovereignty”,  in S. Green 
and W.E. Paterson (eds), Governance in Contemporary Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p 
282.
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External constraints
Successive enlargements to 27 members have transformed the geopolitics of 
the European Union and the emerging picture is one of  a shrinking core and 
an expanding periphery. In this situation the Franco-German core, the default 
choice of Germany  loses traction. This had already been anticipated in the Kohl 
period and helps explain the discourse of irreversibility associated especially and 
perhaps in retrospect a little ironically with the EMU, where it was hoped that the 
centralising logic at the heart of the project could be hard wired into the EU system 
before enlargement took place. In the second Red-Green government, post-Iraq 
isolation led to a very heavy dependence on the Franco-German relationship and 
the declining ability of that relationship to shape the EU in a positive sense became 
manifest, though of course it still functioned as a very powerful ‘arrière garde’: a 
brake rather than a motor on Germany and France’s failure to meet the terms of the 
Stability and Growth Pact in 2002-3 and the reform of the CAP.
The complexity and size of the enlarged EU means that the chances of realising the 
narrow core model as motor of the EU are minimal. Enlargement to 27 members 
entailed institutionalising a logic of diversity, and there is also a clear aggrega-
tion of preferences problem. In a recent study Simon Hix identifies a number of 
coalitions in the Council of Ministers, with the Franco-German coalition being 
seen as pivotal in only 25% of the cases.6 Moreover, Germany constrained by a 
‘resource crunch’ and a hostile public opinion is unwilling and unable to make 
side payments on the scale that lubricated the acceptance of the Kohl-Mitterrand 
agenda. The future seems rather to lie with differentiated integration.7
The Iron Triangle
The establishment of a stable democracy in post war Germany required above 
all a stable and prosperous economy. In laying the foundations for this prosper-
ous economy the key principles were derived from the traumatic failures of earlier 
6 S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2nd ed, 2005.
7 K. Dyson and A. Sepos (eds), Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010.
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German polities, notably the Great Inflation of  1923 and murderous and ultimately 
self-destructive Nazi regime.8 The three key principles constituted  a self reinforc-
ing iron  triangle. The first principle was a rejection of autarchy and an endorsement 
of a hyper-export strategy whereby Germany was in Wolfgang Hager’s characterisa-
tion ‘an extraordinary trader’.
‘Germany is not an ordinary country …’
No other phenomenon marks Germany as an extraordinary trader as much as its 
persistent trade surpluses.9
The second principle based on the 1923 trauma was an unwavering commitment 
to sound money, with the Bundesbank as its independent guardian. The third 
and overarching principle was a European vocation where European integration 
appeared to be part of the DNA of the German governing class. Europe provided 
the access to export markets required by an ‘extraordinary  trader’, and Germany’s 
reflexive multilateralism and its budgetary contribution  made this acceptable to 
other member states.
The Eurocrisis as tipping point?
The establishment of the Eurozone  was seen as reflecting the first and third princi-
ples perfectly and while the sound money principle may have been less obviously 
reflected, reassurance was sought in  the way in which the ECB reflected German 
assumptions and the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact. From the mid 
2000’s  positive attention was focussed on the mounting German surpluses rather 
than ‘the sea of red’ in southern Europe where attention had been centred on 
exploiting the cheap credit rather than making their economies more competi-
tive. This omission was to leave them dangerously exposed after the onset of the 
8 M.G. Schmidt, “Learning from Catastrophes: West Germanys Public Policy”, in F Castles (ed), The Comparative 
History of Public Policy, Cambridge: Polity, 1989.
9 W. Hager, “Germany as an extraordinary trader”, in W. Kohl and G. Basevi (eds), West Germany : A European and 
Global Power, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1980, pp3-43, and pp 3-5.
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recession in 2008 and by early 2010 it became apparent that without external aid, 
Greece was in danger of default.
The  course of the crisis exposed serious weaknesses in the presentation 
and substance of German policy.10 The initial Brussels Summit on 25 March 
2010 allowed Germany supported by France to pursue a narrow national-inter-
est strategy and avoid a bail-out but the situation quickly deteriorated and the 
summit of 7 May indicated that Germany could not prevail with a national-inter-
est strategy without the support of France. In contrast to the past where Germany 
excelled at the strategic level, the current German government appeared to have 
lost its touch on both strategy and tactics and seemed to be playing a  reactive 
negotiating stance badly.11 At the domestic level Chancellor Merkel compound-
ed her weakness in not articulating a vision by failing to confront the Bild Zeitung 
campaign. The agreement to a bail out which is likely to be followed by debt 
rescheduling in some other member states is a severe strain on the  sound money 
principle. Finally German European policy has relied on elite consensus and its 
breakdown in the debate on 21 May is potentially very serious because of its likely 
reinforcing effect for an already less pro-EU integration policy and an increasingly 
negative public opinion.
Conclusion
 ‘For our European friends, they need to come to terms with the fact that Germany 
is going to act just as other countries do in Brussels.’12
De Maizière
The course of the euro crisis has led many to see Chancellor Merkel as a latter-day 
Mrs Thatcher and Germany on a track towards a more British EU policy. There has 
been a perceptible domestication of EU policy with policy sometimes  following 
10 See the case study on the Eurocrisis in S. Bulmer and W.E. Paterson, “From ‘Tamed Power’ to ‘Normalized 
Power’”,  International Affairs,  forthcoming.
11 For the distinction between German excellence at EU strategy and UK excellence at tactics see S. Bulmer, C. 
Jeffery and W.E. Paterson Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu, Manchester: MUP, 2000.
12 Quoted in J. Chaffin, ”Why a fearful Germany is refusing to rush to the rescue”, Financial Times, 25th May 2010 
p10.
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rather than leading public opinion.13 Sometimes too  the path taken has been an 
Alleingang and perceptible differences have opened up on some key issues with 
France. So far so British. 
Whatever may have been the merits of UK European policy for the United Kingdom, 
it will not ultimately prove a promising template for Germany or the EU. Unlike 
Britain, Germany is an extraordinary beneficiary from EU trade and has an existen-
tial interest in maintaining the basic frameworks of the EU, including the Eurozone, 
which continue  to benefit Germany greatly. Its facility in coalition making at the 
EU level has acted as a force multiplier.14 It is not at all clear that a state defined 
by internal semi-sovereignty and institutional pluralism with a very high number 
of veto players can identify and pursue a clear national interest in the manner 
of France and the United Kingdom. It would require a fundamental reform of the 
current complex decision-making but this would be very difficult ‘owing to  its 
embeddedness in a de-concentrated pattern of authority amongst ministers and 
to the now established  pattern that each coalition partner holds one of the co-
ordination points’.15 Role theory would also indicate that changing one’s role 
is very difficult, as was shown by the failure of Tony Blair to change the United 
Kingdom’s attitude towards the EU.16 More broadly, Germany’s size and central-
ity make it more equal than other member states and a  European policy driven 
entirely by a narrow national interest would have a harmful effect on the EU.17
Germany now needs to be less reactive and develop a new European strategy. 
Having been instrumental in the successful salvage of the Lisbon Treaty, it is dis-
appointing that the Chancellor  seems so bereft of ideas of how to use the new 
machinery. Urgent attention ought to be given to addressing the possibilities of 
the new institutional relationships. Coordination with France remains vital though 
it needs to be less exclusive if it is to lead the expanded EU rather than being a 
defensive alliance. Public opinion needs to be addressed through stressing the 
13 S. Harnisch, ”The Politics of Domestication: A New Paradigm in German Foreign Policy”, German Politics Vol 18, 
4, 2009, pp 455-469.
14 H W. Maull, “Germany and the Art of Coalition Building”, Journal of European Integration Vol 30, 2008, pp 
131-152.
15 Bulmer and Paterson,  forthcoming.
16 W.E. Paterson, “Strategy and Politics in the Blair Era”, in J. Raschke and R. Tils (eds) Strategie in der 
Politikwissenschaft: Konturen eines neuen Forschungsfelds, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010, pp 301 -322.
17 This point is developed in J. Fischer, “Mrs Europa ist jetzt Frau Germania”, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 29th March 
2010.
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benefits of EU and Eurozone membership, a step Chancellor Merkel took only after 
the North Rhine Westphalia election. Alongside this obvious move, a new vision 
needs to be articulated, focusing less on the last century and on Kohlian war and 
peace and avoidance of nationalism sonorities, and more on building on  Europe’s 
political and economic  role in a new global order where Europe  is challenged by 
rising powers. This might mean for example that the defence load would be taken 
by France and the United Kingdom. Closer cooperation remains vital for Germany 
and its European partners.
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Where is Germany heading?
More than ever, Germany is today the focus of much attention on the European scene. 
The difficult negotiation over the assistance package to Greece and the setting up of a 
stabilisation fund has earned Chancellor Merkel bad press. Germany has been castiga-
ted and blamed for a lack of vision for its reluctance to help its Eurozone partners who 
are also among its main clients. However, much of this criticism could be turned on its 
head. As Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, President of Notre Europe, has recalled in a recent 
paper, no European country has ever consented to as big a transfer of sovereignty as 
Germany did when it accepted to do away with the Deutsche Mark. That, in and of itself, 
is sufficient to explain why she has found it difficult to tolerate the unruly behaviour of 
other Eurozone members. Moreover, it required great courage on the part of Mrs. Merkel 
to eventually accept the rescue package against a majority of German public opinion 
and the advice of some of her most prominent advisers. Nonetheless, the fact remains 
that Germany now finds itself in a leadership position that it has not sought, and that it 
seems at times reluctant to exert. This is why it seems appropriate to discuss some of the 
factors that shape its European policy. 
To this end, Notre Europe has turned to a series of experts who examine the changes 
that have taken place at various levels. Can Germany really be considered more inward-
looking than it used to be before? Is this a long-term trend? How can the evolution of 
German European policy be explained? What are the current driving actors and forces? 
Contributions have been made by German experts and are completed by a British exter-
nal point of view.
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